



REPORT ON

2024 CHICAGO YACHT CLUB RACE TO MACKINAC CREW OVERBOARD INCIDENT – *CALLISTO*

This report details the crew overboard (COB) incident from the J/125 yacht *Callisto*, and successful recovery by the Santa Cruz 52 yacht *Madcap* in a late evening storm on Lake Michigan on Saturday, July 13, 2024, during the 2024 Chicago Yacht Club Race to Mackinac (“Race”). *Callisto* and *Madcap* were competing in the Race’s Section 3 and Section 2 respectively. Both sections had started early that afternoon east of the Chicago Harbor Light, and at the time of the COB event *Callisto* had completed approximately 97 nm of the 289 nm race to a position 25 nm from the Michigan shore to the east, 35 nm from the Wisconsin shore to the west, and 50 miles north of the Illinois-Wisconsin border (See Appendix F for overview map).

A panel was commissioned to compile interviews, review the incident details, and provide findings and recommendations for the Chicago Yacht Club Mackinac Committee. As well, the panel hopes that by writing this report and making it publicly available, the broader sailing community will learn from this incident. The panel believes that the safety and preparedness of all will benefit from the work here.

Broadly, the crews on both *Callisto* and *Madcap* were well versed in best offshore safety practices as well as each vessel’s individual safety equipment and procedures. The fact that *Callisto* was transmitting AIS data and *Madcap* was actively monitoring AIS position data of nearby boats contributed significantly to the successful COB recovery. Both vessels’ crews acted quickly in response to the COB, however this incident highlights that even highly experienced crews are not immune to marine incidents. This incident highlights the value of bridge, crew resource, and risk management practices that promote effective divisions of responsibility and redundancy of roles aboard. Gaps in these best practices aboard one vessel led to an incident, while the implementation of these concepts by the other facilitated an efficient and effective rescue.

In addition to video interviews and correspondence with Jim Murray and Shawn Dougherty (*Callisto*) and Marian and John Hoskins (*Madcap*), details for this report were contributed by correspondence with Jason Andrews (*Callisto*, navigator), Mike Evans (*Pommes Frites*, skipper), and Dan Lewis (*MC^2*, skipper).

Chicago Yacht Club Race to Mackinac
Callisto Crew Overboard Incident Panel
March 26, 2025

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

On July 13, 2024, at approximately 22:17(CDT) Shawn Dougherty fell overboard off the sailing vessel *Callisto* during the Chicago Yacht Club Race to Mackinac. Strong storms were rolling through the area, and *Callisto* was seeing increasing windspeeds of 25kts+ along with large wind shifts. The crew of *Callisto* had been monitoring storm cells via satellite weather radar (accessed via satellite internet connection) in the hours leading up to the incident. At the time of the incident, the crew had nearly completed a letterbox spinnaker douse. Shawn was moving along the side deck to a position that protected him in the event of an uncontrolled gybe. A wind shift required Jim Murray (skipper of *Callisto*, driving at the time) to turn the boat quickly. A strong gust accompanied the shift, heeling the boat dramatically, causing Shawn to lose balance and fall backwards over the starboard lifeline. Members of the crew initiated their practiced COB procedures, however the vessel lost headway and steerage as the spinnaker fell into the water and wrapped around the rudder.

Shawn found himself uninjured in the water. He was equipped with race required safety gear: inflatable PFD and harness (which deployed automatically) with crotch/leg straps, and in a belt pack an Ocean Signal MOB1 (AIS MOB unit), knife, and whistle. Shawn's belt pack also contained an additional strobe light.

Madcap was less than 0.75nm away at the time of the incident. Owned by John (skipper) and Marian Hoskins, *Madcap* was alerted to the COB via DSC message and VHF call from *Callisto*. John was at the navigation station, and responded on VHF that *Madcap* was nearby and would set a course towards *Callisto* to assist. John quickly created a waypoint on *Madcap's* instruments to head for *Callisto's* position and informed the crew that they were suspending racing to respond to the COB. Shortly after, Shawn's AIS MOB signal was picked up on *Madcap's* navigation plotter, and John had *Madcap* alter course to intercept the position being broadcast.

Madcap initially navigated to Shawn's position via his AIS MOB signal, and subsequently his strobe light once in visual range. Having doused sails and started their engine, the crew approached under motor power, threw the boat's Lifesling, and pulled Shawn onboard at the transom. The time was approximately 22:30, and Shawn had been in the water for an estimated 13 minutes.

Findings from the panel include that a COB incident can happen to an experienced crew when attempting to reduce sail, even when using a conservative maneuver such as a Letterbox takedown, when other prudent aspects of seamanship such as clipping in are forgotten. Unclipping a tether while moving on deck provided the right opportunity at the wrong time and allowed Shawn to fall overboard. The use of external weather radar, while a powerful tool, has nuances and limitations for interpreting storm cells, and does not provide information akin to that of onboard radar. Clear communication with nearby boats (via DSC, AIS, and verbal VHF communications) was key in both alerting nearby vessels and aiding those vessels in their ability to navigate to Shawn's position. Electing not to set up personal safety equipment for automatic deployment may place crew that go overboard at significant risk if they are unconscious or unable to assist in their own rescue.

Aboard the responding vessel, a conservative sail-plan allowed for quick response and the ability to provide assistance. The clear delineation of roles on *Madcap* and intentional redundancy of skills amongst the long-time crew (consistent with recognized best practices of crew and bridge resource management) greatly contributed to the efficacy of *Madcap's* response.

The panel recommends that the Mackinac Committee adopt a requirement that all boats have the ability to transmit AIS signals at all times during the race. The panel also recommends that the committee strongly encourage the use of double ended or "Y" tethers for at least some crew roles to facilitate the ability to remain positively connected to the vessel when moving about the deck - especially around obstacles that can include other crew members. The committee should, wherever possible, emphasize and assist with education in the limits of weather radar, the use of emergency communications equipment, and the details of emergency navigation equipment – both personal and boat systems. A full list of best practices, lessons, and additional recommendations can be found on page 6.

INCIDENT OVERVIEW:

Callisto, owned and skippered by Jim Murray, was competing in the Race's Trophy Cup Division which started off the Chicago Harbor Light on the afternoon of Saturday, July 13th, 2024. Multiple strong storms rolled through the fleet that evening with strong gusts. *Pommes Frites*, less than two nautical miles north of *Callisto*, recorded a gust of 80 kts for about 30 seconds, 65 knots for about 90 seconds, and a 90-degree wind shift. *Evolution*, a Great Lakes 70, was 1nm NNE and "heeled over 90 degrees for what seemed like 2-1/2 minutes" as the storm struck. *Liberté*, 42nm north in the Cruising Division, recorded a gust of 72 kts. In the fleet of 252 boats, three vessels were dismasted, and multiple boats experienced ripped sails and other hardware failure. Eighteen boats retired, and from the information available, it was concluded that all but two retirements were due to the storms.

Callisto monitored the storms via NOAA weather radio, and National Weather Service resources (via Starlink). By 2145 CDT they concluded the storm threats had passed, and changed from storm mode (reefed main, small J4 jib) to full race mode (full main, A2 spinnaker, J4 jib). At approximately 2217 CDT *Callisto* crew member Shawn Dougherty fell overboard during a letterbox spinnaker takedown maneuver in a strong breeze. He was wearing a Race safety equipment requirement compliant life jacket with integral harness, a tether, and a belt pack containing an AIS MOB device and strobe light. Shawn had been tethered in on the starboard side deck, just forward of the cabin top winch for the take down. The spinnaker takedown was roughly 2/3 complete. Recognizing the potential of injury from the boom should an unintended gybe occur, Shawn decided to move back to the cockpit and trim the jib. He unclipped and began to move aft along the side deck in a crouch, left hand on the lifeline, to pass outboard of two crew mates. *Callisto* was on a starboard tack when it was hit with a strong gust accompanied by a 30-degree header. The combined motions of sudden increase in heel and rapid 30-degree turn of the boat in response to the header to prevent a broach resulted in Shawn being thrown backward over the starboard lifeline.

Shawn's life jacket automatically inflated. He retrieved and activated the AIS MOB device and the strobe from his belt pack. The pit person released his grip on the spinnaker to grab for Shawn as he went overboard. The spinnaker filled and carried into the water where it fouled the rudder, rendering *Callisto* unable to return to Shawn. The navigator came up from below to press the COB button located on the binnacle, then returned below to broadcast a PAN-PAN that *Callisto* had a COB situation. The US Coast Guard Cutter *Katmai Bay* accompanying the fleet quickly responded to the PAN-PAN and was given the position of *Callisto* via VHF. After speaking with the USCG, the navigator activated the red emergency button on the fixed VHF to issue an all-ship DSC alert. The DSC alert (broadcast from *Callisto* at 22:21:20 CDT), PAN-PAN call, and AIS MOB emergency transmission were received by several race boats in the vicinity, including *Pommes Frites*, OC68, MC[^]2, and *Madcap*. *Madcap*, owned by John and Marian Hoskins and skippered by John, was the closest boat to *Callisto* – less than 0.75 nm.

In advance of the approaching storm, *Madcap* had reduced sail to a double reefed main and J4 and was actively tracking *Callisto* and other nearby competitors via their AIS transmissions. As a result, *Madcap* knew she was close to *Callisto*'s location and immediately responded to the PAN-PAN broadcast that she would assist. *Madcap* altered course and began to motor toward *Callisto*. *Madcap* soon dropped her jib and eventually dropped the main shortly before reaching the COB site. They had initially received and set navigation instruments to *Callisto*'s lat/lon position via a DSC alert message, followed a few minutes later with Shawn's lat/lon position broadcast from his AIS MOB device. *Madcap* approached Shawn slowly under power and successfully recovered him, uninjured, at 2230 CDT. OC68, owned by Oakcliff Sailing and skippered by Ethan Johnson, had also proceeded to the COB area and stood nearby during the recovery.

All three boats, *Callisto*, *Madcap*, and OC68 resumed racing and finished the race. *Madcap* was granted a redress of 45-minute reduction of elapsed time, and won Second Place, Section 2. OC68 was granted a redress of 1 hour 15-minute reduction of elapsed time to 10th Place, Section 1. *Callisto*, without redress, won First Place, Section 3.

On July 16, 2024, US Sailing expeditiously awarded the crew of Madcap the Arthur B. Hanson Rescue Medal for their outstanding seamanship, watchkeeping, and situational awareness that resulted in the successful rescue of Shawn Dougherty.

THE RACE - BACKGROUND:

The Chicago Yacht Club Race to Mackinac is an annual 289 nautical mile race on Lake Michigan from Chicago, IL to Mackinac Island, MI. 252 boats were entered in the 2024 race. Safety equipment requirements for boat and crew are governed by the Chicago Mackinac Safety Requirements (“CMSRs”). The CMSRs reflect the fact that the Race is conducted in conditions similar in many aspects of both open ocean and coastal sailboat racing. While the major portion of the CMSRs is contained in the US Sailing Monohull Coastal Safety Equipment Requirements, many are from the US Sailing Ocean version. A significant number of the CMSR requirements are variations of the US Sailing Ocean SERs or Coastal SERs modified to address safety concerns specific to the Race.

The Chicago Yacht Club Mackinac Committee (“Mac Committee”) represents the Chicago Yacht Club Regatta Association, Inc. (“CYCRA”) as the Organizing Authority of the Race. The Race is hosted by the Chicago Yacht Club (“CYC”). This report was created by a panel of individuals who are or were members of the Mac Committee, CYC, CYCMC, or the US Sailing Safety at Sea Committee. The Mac Committee commissioned this report to document the key facts surrounding and contributing to the COB event and recovery, to make recommendations to enhance the safety of offshore racing and reduce the likelihood of a future similar incident. *Details of the panel members are included in Appendix I – Report Panel.*

INCIDENT TIMELINE:

(NOTE: All times are approximate unless expressed with separators – e.g. hh:mm:ss. Entries preceded with four dashes “----” simply indicates we believe is the approximate order between times.)

2115 CDT – (T-62) *Callisto* - monitoring weather for approaching storm, sailing with reefed main, J4

2145 CDT – (T-32) *Callisto* – concludes worst of storm passed, increases sail – full main, J4, A2 spinnaker

2200 CDT – (T-17) *Callisto* - rigs spinnaker dousing line to prepare for letterbox takedown

2208 CDT – (T-9) *Madcap* - monitoring storm, reduces sail to 1st reef main, J4

2210 CDT – (T-7) *Callisto* – changes COG from 46 to 68, speed from 9.5 kts to 12.1 kts (per YB Tracking)

2212 CDT – (T-5) *Madcap* – storm hits – records True Wind Speed 27 kts, True Wind Direction 215

2215 CDT – (T-2) *Madcap* – observes *Callisto* cross bow – AIS mapping shows *Callisto* 14 kts SOG, 74 COG, then slowing to 5kts SOG

2217 CDT – (T 0) *Callisto* - Shawn overboard (Per *Madcap* AIS tracking of *Callisto* and *Callisto* navigator)

---- *Callisto* - MOM 8S released, tangles in spinnaker, trapped under water

---- *Callisto* - Navigator comes topside to press COB button on binnacle (not activated – did not hold button long enough). Returns to nav station to initiate communications.

~2219 CDT – (T+2) *Callisto* – Navigator broadcasts PAN-PAN on channel 16, request for assistance recovering COB. USCG Cutter Katmai Bay (seven nm away) responds. Navigator provides USCG lat/lon over VHF.

2220 CDT – (T+3) *Madcap* - AIS mapping shows AIS *Callisto* slow to 1.2kt SOG

---- *Callisto* - Navigator activates red emergency button on VHF to initiate all-ship emergency DSC alert

22:21:20 CDT – (T+4) *Madcap* - receives first *Callisto* DSC alert on VHF. Initially sees only lat/lon on radio but knows from AIS mapping *Callisto* is close. Range: 0.73nm, Bearing: 127 degrees. *Madcap* hears for first

time *Callisto* broadcasting they have COB, no steerage. *Madcap* responds they will assist. Suspends racing.

---- OC68 responds by VHF. They proceed to area of COB, standby as backup to *Madcap*.

22:21:50 CDT – (T+5) *Madcap* executes 258-degree tack from starboard to port rather than gybe. Turns from heading of 23 to 125. TWD 215, TWS approximately 20 kts. Jib doused.

22:22:20 CDT – (T+5) *Madcap* – engine on

22:23:40 CDT – (T+7) *Madcap* - jib down

22:24:53 CDT – (T+8) *Madcap* – receives COB signal from Shawn’s AIS MOB1. Range ~ 0.45nm. Navigator responds by changing target waypoint from *Callisto* to Shawn’s AIS MOB1 lat/lon.

22:25:20 CDT – (T+8) *Madcap* - receives 2nd DSC alert. Continues to navigate to AIS MOB1 target lat/lon.

22:27:30 CDT – (T+10) *Madcap* – main down, proceeding under engine power only

22:28: CDT – (T+11) *Madcap* – approaching COB under power, turns south to approach from windward. Spotlight on COB.

22:29:20 CDT (T+12) *Madcap* – receives 3rd DSC alert

22:30: CDT – (T+13) *Madcap* – stops to windward of COB off port quarter. Lifesling thrown 15 feet to COB. Crew pulls Shawn by Lifesling from water onto stepped transom.

22:33:20 CDT – (T+16) *Madcap* receives 4th DSC alert.

22:37:20 CDT – (T+20) *Madcap* receives final DSC alert. A total of 5 DSC alerts from *Callisto* were received at 4 minutes intervals during the rescue. *Callisto* navigator reported turning off DSC alert broadcast sometime after COB recovered.

PANEL CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, & RECOMMENDATIONS:

The panel finds several best practices which should be highlighted from this event:

- Real time AIS tracking of nearby competitors enhanced situational awareness and ability to respond quickly and render assistance, especially at night with limited visibility due to weather.
- Reduced sail plan with approaching heavy weather allowed for fast response.
- Pre-planning for a letterbox spinnaker take down allowed for a quick response to the wind change.
- Long term experience and clear delineation of roles made for clean storm prep, sail changes, and rescue. This went so far as to allow the PIC to manage the overall response, rather than be at the helm.
- Use of engine with sails down provided a safe and quick approach to the COB.
- The rescue was accomplished by navigating to the COB using the location data transmitted by AIS MOB1 until close enough for a visual on the COB’s strobe light.

From this event, the panel finds there are many lessons that can be learned by all competitors:

- Experienced and prepared crews can still find themselves in incidents like this – even during conservative maneuvers. Preparation, training, and knowledge of equipment is paramount for every boat.
- The skipper of a vessel maintains the ultimate responsibility for the safety and well-being of the crew. However, when engaged in functions that demand focus and concentration, it is imperative that other crew members be tasked with direct oversight of key operational tasks. Every crew member should feel empowered to remind others about adhering to the best practices of proper seamanship like clipping in, maintaining accountability for crew, and safe sail and line handling techniques.
- Staying tethered to the vessel is a key to radically reducing the likelihood of a crew overboard incident. The proper tethering techniques including the use of double leg (“Y”) tethers ensure consistent connection to the vessel should be emphasized.

- Maintaining a calm attitude and not panicking while in the water allowed the COB to assist with his own rescue, by activating his AIS MOB unit and strobe light
- The possibility that a COB may be injured or unconscious should be considered in the choice of personal safety equipment and whether the equipment is automatically or manually activated.
- External weather radar is a powerful tool. It also has limitations. All competitors should have a thorough understanding of its functionality and limitations.
- Every vessel can have different navigation equipment with varying features to aid in an emergency incident. Thorough understanding of the operation of your specific equipment, the messages it transmits and receives, and the visual and aural alerts it emits, is an important responsibility of all competitors.
- Use of the DSC Distress Alert message can be a key to alert nearby vessels in any dire situation. When boats are in rough conditions, verbal messages over VHF are easily missed. Understanding your specific VHF is an important responsibility of all competitors.
- Consider the location of clip points and jacklines on your specific boat. Consider tether length relative to the arrest of the fall should a crew member fall overboard even while clipped in.

The panel makes the following recommendations to the Chicago Yacht Club Mackinac Committee:

- Consider a requirement that all boats be equipped with AIS transceivers that broadcast and receive position information throughout the race.
- Emphasize and assist with education in the limits of weather radar, the use of emergency communications equipment, and the details of emergency navigation equipment. This should focus on both personal and boat systems.
- Consider a recommendation that AIS MOB devices be attached to the users PFD, and If the PFD is inflatable that the device be installed and rigged for automatic activation.
- Consider a recommendation that a high-powered strobe mounted to each PFD.
- Consider a recommendation for double leg (“Y”) tethers for at least a minimum portion of each crew

PART 1 – LEAD UP TO COB - *Callisto* / Jim Murray (skipper; video interview, email), **Shawn Dougherty** (COB; video interview), **Jason Andrews** (navigator; email)

Callisto started the race in Section 3 at 1330 CDT, July 13th, 2024. Jim Murray owns and skippers the boat. Jim is an experienced offshore sailor and skipper, having skippered in the Race many times, as well as having competed in numerous ocean races around the world. Shawn Dougherty is an experienced offshore sailor, competed in numerous offshore events, including two Chicago Yacht Club Race to Mackinac races, Newport-Bermuda, Transpac, Pac Cup, Swiftsure, and Caribbean 600 races.

The seven-person crew of *Callisto* was divided into two three-person watches, plus a floater/navigator. Each person on a three-hour watch rotated between duties at helm, main trim, spinnaker trim. All hands are called on deck for any sail change, most gybes, and “any sketchy situation like an incoming storm”. Each crew member returns to a specific “Starting Position” during an all-hands event.

Starboard Watch – Start Position	Port Watch – Start Position	Floater
Jim Murray – Helm Owner, Skipper, Person-in-Charge	Jared Henderson – Pit Watch Captain	Jason Andrews – Navigator
Steve Orlebeke – Main Trim Reserve-Person-in-Charge, Watch Captain	Shawn Dougherty –Offside Trim	
Robert “Rob” Evans II – Primary trim	Steven Leuck - Bow	

All crew on *Callisto* had extensive offshore racing experience. The personal profiles of the crew indicated a combined total of 952 nights of overnight racing/passage-making, as well as 294 overnight races, and 55 Chicago Mac races. Six of the seven crew had current Safety at Sea training – five of which were International Safety at Sea w/Hands-On courses. *Full crew details + experience narratives included at Appendix A – Callisto Crew Details.*

TIMELINE OF COB INCIDENT - DETAILED:

(NOTE: Times are approximate unless indicated separators – e.g. hh:mm:ss)

2115 CDT (T-62 Minutes prior to COB):

Callisto crew was actively monitoring NOAA radio and National Weather Service weather radar via Starlink. They reduced sails from the A2 & Full Main with staysail to the J4 & Reefed Main for the approaching storm. All seven hands were on deck when the storm reached them. Wind rapidly built to 30 kts TWS with gusts into the 37 kt range. The boat was making great time, and with the reefed main and their smallest jib felt under control. There were 3 crew on the rail, and 4 more in the cockpit.

2145 CDT (T-32 Minutes prior to COB):

Wind was clocking southwesterly. Wave state settled, and the rain had stopped. Weather radar images (National Weather Service) were refreshed via Starlink. Saw no active convection to the north. Weather radar was showing green (rain) to the north of their position. To the south the radar showed active storm cells. Clearing skies were noted to the west. The storm front that initially had looked like a solid wall appeared to have dissipated. Many boats [note: at least 4 overtaking boats per YB tracking] had passed *Callisto* with their spinnakers up while *Callisto* was reefed. A “Let’s Go” call was made to resume full-on race mode.

2200 CDT (T-17 Minutes prior to COB):

Callisto now sailing with full main, J4 and A2. They prepared for a letterbox takedown. Rigged a dousing line for the kite to the windward (starboard) cabin top winch. Wind conditions moderate – 12kts gusting to 17 kts True Wind Speed. *Callisto* was steering to a True Wind Angle of 135-140 degrees. Weather to starboard (east) consisted of large storm clouds. To port (west) they could see the weather breaking. Jim felt a wind line coming from behind him – close to perpendicular to the boat’s line of advance. Boat lights to windward were “winking out”. Jim noted the wind becoming “a little squirrely” with several small but rapid shifts. He called for a letterbox spinnaker douse.

The crew of *Callisto* began execution of the letterbox spinnaker douse. Jim was steering the boat to maintain a 160-degree TWA for the takedown. Crew were all in their standard assigned places/roles (*Crew placement diagram at Appendix A*) for the takedown:

- Jim Murray – driving, straddling the wheel,
- Steve Orlebeke -main trim, shoulder to shoulder with Murray,

- Jason Andrews – below deck gathering spinnaker through companionway hatch,
- Jared Henderson - pit, at companionway above Andrews, coordinating letterbox drop, working halyard, tackline, and assisting feeding sail to Andrews,
- Rob Evans - at forward bulkhead, starboard edge of cockpit, pulling sail down,
- Steven Leuck – assisting hauling in spinnaker, immediately aft of Evans
- Shawn Dougherty – clipped in, kneeling against cabin top on starboard side deck to pull spinnaker take-down line, assist pulling down sail

2217 CDT (T-0) COB:

The spinnaker was 2/3 doused. Shawn felt there were enough other hands on the spinnaker, and given the potential of an accidental gybe he should return to the cockpit to trim the jib. He unclipped from the jackline. With his left hand on the lifeline, he began to move aft in a crouch, squeezing outboard of Evans and Leuck on the narrow side deck.

The wind rapidly shifted forward 30 degrees, gusting to 27-30 kts. The boat quickly heeled to more than 45 degrees. Jim rapidly turned down 30 degrees to keep the boat from broaching on jib and main alone. The combination of the boat rapidly heeling and turning caused Shawn to do a backward somersault off the windward (starboard) lifeline, landing on his back in the water.

PART 2 - OVERBOARD - Shawn Dougherty – video interview

The crew of Callisto operates with two shifts of 3. Shawn and the other two members of his watch were below until an “all hands” call for the first spinnaker take down. All clipped in as they came up from below deck when the call came for the second spinnaker take down. The bowman was on the starboard side deck, just forward of the cockpit. Shawn positioned himself just forward of the bowman to help with the letterbox douse into the companionway and clipped onto the jackline. When the spinnaker was 2/3rd down he “...recalled that during these types of situations ...wind can shift, and you can accidentally tack or gybe...”. Given that there were three other crew attending the spinnaker at this point, he felt it wise to return to the cockpit. He pivoted around the bowman, hands on lifeline, to move to the cockpit. At the same time a strong gust hit the boat. The sudden heel to port caused him to do a backward somersault off the windward starboard side into the water.

It “happened in a nanosecond. Incredibly quick”.

Shawn hit the water, landing on his back, and plunged several feet deep until his lifejacket deployed. When he surfaced, he took a deep breath and relaxed, told himself to make sure he was OK. He checked for injuries and found none. He cinched up his life jacket and legs to keep as much warmth in as possible. His crotch straps were in place and properly adjusted. He released a small amount of air from his lifejacket bladder to make it more comfortable. Once his breathing was calm, he reached into the belt pack to retrieve the ACR Firefly strobe and AIS MOB device, both of which were attached to the belt pack with short tethers. Shawn deployed the strobe first. The strobe had three modes – strobe, SOS, and steady. As it was not set to water activated, he manually switched it on to strobe mode. He then cautiously retrieved the AIS MOB1 and manually activated it. [NOTE: Manual activation of this device requires sliding a red plastic “Arming Slide” piece down, then sliding a grey plastic “Activation Slide” piece left or right to release the antenna and begin transmitting.] Shawn held both the AIS MOB device and the strobe above his head to ensure a clear signal and visibility.

Shawn checked his watch. He wanted to have some sense of how long he was in the water, and how much longer it might take. He figured it would take *Callisto* at least 15 minutes to return to him as he knew they had issues. At this point he was not concerned. He knew that with over 200 boats in the race (all with required AIS

receivers) someone would come by. It was “not a question of IF, rather WHEN [he] would get picked up – because of all the practice done with the crew”. Water temperature was “reasonable”, so he figured he had at least 1-1/2 hours that he would be OK in the water. The only variable he felt was out of his control was the amount of lightning strikes around him. He had no idea how close it could strike before he would feel an effect.

After “15-20 minutes” he saw a vessel heading directly toward him. He knew because the bow light was lined up with the masthead light. He was positive it was *Callisto*. Shawn used his whistle (standard flat orange life jacket model) every 10 seconds for the last three minutes as the boat approached. When the boat was about 100 feet away, he asked them to turn to starboard 10 degrees – he didn’t want to get run over. Told them he was fine, no injuries, and asked how they wanted to proceed.

The crew of *Madcap* threw the Lifesling. “It was a good throw”, but he had to swim a short distance to it. He was maneuvered to the transom. Shawn noted that the vertical motion of the transom was not excessive, and that he would be able to hold himself off and avoid being hit as he was pulled up by two crew members (Marian Hoskins and Mark Strube).

After assuring everyone on deck that he was fine, Shawn went below where he assured skipper John Hoskins, he was fine. They conferred via VHF with Jim and decided not to try to transfer Shawn back to *Callisto*.

PART 3 – RECOVERY – Santa Cruz 52 *MADCAP* / John & Marian Hoskins

The Santa Cruz 52 *Madcap* is owned by John and Marian Hoskins and was skippered by John. *Madcap* was sailing with a total crew of 11. The crew had sailed together for a long time – the newest crew member having been on board four years, the oldest 15 years. John and Marian believe in being conservative, prepared, and proactively reefing ahead of storms.

Madcap was equipped with Starlink to monitor weather via NOAA hi-res radar. John indicated the NOAA hi-res radar was a great advantage compared to the consumer grade weather radar available. The boat has no active radar. It is equipped with an AIS transponder to transmit and receive AIS data. Expedition navigation software is used to track nearby boats that are transmitting AIS. John stressed that during storms someone is always at the nav station – usually John, sometimes either watch captain Mike Smith or Marian – for comms and to watching for traffic. *Madcap* was mapping a half dozen competitors during the race, including *Callisto*.

2200 CDT – (T-17) Shortly before 2200 CDT John noticed via AIS that *Callisto* was ahead on the racecourse and to the NW, on track to cross ahead of *Madcap*. John popped his head up to tell the crew to watch for *Callisto*. John was the sole person below. The remainder of the 11-person crew was on deck – either in the cockpit or the weather rail.

2208 CDT – (T-9) John was monitoring the approaching storm. He ordered a double reefed main and J4 headsail in preparation.

2215 CDT – (T-2) John noted *Callisto* cross *Madcap*’s bow and continue eastward. Later review of *Madcap*’s AIS mapping indicated *Callisto* at 14 kts SOG, 74 COG, then slowing to 5kts SOG.

[NOTE: 2217 – 2220 inserted below for timeline clarity. Not observed at the time by *Madcap*]

2217 CDT – (T-0) *Callisto*- Shawn overboard (Per *Madcap* AIS tracking of *Callisto* and *Callisto* navigator) Not yet observed by *Madcap*.

2219 CDT – (T+2) (estimate) *Callisto* – navigator broadcasts PAN-PAN, request for assistance recovering COB. USCG responds. Navigator provides USCG lat/lon over VHF. Only after conversation with USCG, is red emergency button on VHF pressed to activate DSC alert message.

2220 CDT – (T+3) *Callisto* had slowed to approximately 1 kt.

22:21:20 CDT – (T+4) *Madcap* receives the first DSC distress alert from *Callisto* with only lat/lon. Had not heard the PAN-PAN broadcast. Immediately following the DSC alert John heard VHF broadcast from *Callisto* requesting assistance for COB recovery, and that the boat had no steerage. The DSC alert data from *Callisto* indicated she was 0.73 nm southeast of *Madcap*, at a bearing of 127 degrees. John immediately responded that *Madcap* would assist. He accepted the DSC alert data which then was displayed on the mast instruments. John informed the crew that they had suspended racing and were recovering a COB. John indicated only two other boats also responded by VHF to the request for emergency assistance: *OC68* (owned by Oakcliff Sailing, skippered by Ethan Johnson) and *Pommes Frites* (Pogo 50 owned and skippered by Mike Evans). John heard no other boats respond to *Callisto*.

[NOTE: *OC68* had been 1.75 nm behind *Callisto*, to the SW. After responding to *Callisto*'s VHF, she proceeded to the area and stood by until Shawn was reported recovered. *Pommes Frites* was 1.75 nm due north of *Callisto*. Mike Evans, *Pommes Frites* skipper, reported to the panel that although *Pommes Frites* responded to the VHF call, she was in her own urgent situation as she had been hit with gale force gusts and sudden 90 degrees shift of wind direction.]

22:21:50 CDT – (T+5) Within 30 seconds they had the boat turned toward *Callisto*. Mike Smith ("one of the best drivers") was at the helm on *Madcap*. Marian (Watch Captain) was making sure everything was being done correctly, and importantly relaying information between the navigator and crew. Rather than gybe, *Madcap* executed a 258-degree tack from starboard to port and turned from a heading of 23 to 125. John remained at the nav station to monitor navigation to Shawn and maintain VHF communication with *Callisto*, the US Coast Guard, and other boats. The wind was around 20 kts from 215 and seas were confused with 2–3-foot waves.

22:22:20 CDT – (T+5) Engine turned on.

22:23:40 CDT – (T+7) Jib brought down to improve visibility and control.

22:24:53 CDT – (T+8) Receives the COB emergency message from Shawn's AIS MOB1 beacon indicating he was 0.72 nm from *Madcap* at a bearing of 120 degrees. John accepted the COB emergency message, and the navigation displays of range/bearing above and below deck switched to Shawn's location. John could see on his chart plotter and Expedition that *Callisto* was farther away – 0.3 nm NE of Shawn.

22:25:20 CDT – (T+8) Receives 2nd DSC alert. Continues to navigate to AIS MOB target. Approximately ½ nm from Shawn the crew of *Madcap* spotted his strobe light. The strobing light made it much easier to pick out from the steady navigation lights of the other boats in sight. A block and tackle were rigged by the crew. They intended to use it to extend the spinnaker halyard to reach the Lifesling. Use of the block and tackle had not been practiced, but the crew knew it would help the spinnaker halyard reach and attach to the Lifesling.

22:27:30 CDT – (T+10) Main sail dropped. Proceeding under engine power only as they prepare to approach COB.

2228 CDT – (T+11) Turns south to approach Shawn very slowly, "almost to a stop". "Having the main down gave us a lot more options. More under control, and you don't have the boom swinging around as a danger to the

crew. If the main filled, we would have been doing 5 kts.” Matthew Rubsam has spotlight on COB as they approached, Shawn assured them he was OK and uninjured.

22:29:20 CDT - (T+12) 3rd DSC alert received from *Callisto*.

22:30 CDT – (T+13) Stops 15 feet to windward of Shawn off *Madcap*’s port quarter. Mark Strube threw the Lifesling. Shawn reported swimming 20 feet to the Lifesling, but even though it he was wearing an inflated PFD, it was not an issue. Decision was made to retrieve Shawn via the stern scoop step. Marian and Mark, standing inside the stern lifelines, pulled Shawn up to the stern step while Shawn held himself off the stern, then assisted by grabbing and pulling on the lifeline.

Time of recovery of the uninjured Shawn: 2230 CDT, less than 15 minutes from Shawn going overboard and nine minutes from the initial DSC alert activated by *Callisto*.

John and Jim concluded that transfer of Shawn back to *Callisto* was not warranted given the sea state. *Callisto*, *Madcap*, and *OC68* resumed racing.

22:33:20 CDT - (T+16) 4th DSC alert received from *Callisto*.

22:37:20 CDT – (T+20) 5th and final DSC alert received from *Callisto*. *Callisto* navigator finally has opportunity to cancel DSC alerts.

PART 4 – EQUIPMENT, LESSONS LEARNED, & RECOMMENDATIONS – COMPETITOR PERSPECTIVES:

Equipment Involved:

COB:

Spinlock Deckvest VITO lifejacket equipped with Pylon light (1 candela), Lume-On bladder lights
Single ended tether
ACR Firefly Pro Waterbug Solas (manually or water activated, modes: Strobe (41 candela), SOS, Steady
Ocean Signal “rescueME AIS MOB1” device (AIS & DSC transmission capable)
Whistle

CALLISTO :

Switlik MOM8-S
25w VHF emergency DSC (“red button”)
COB Button on binnacle
AIS receiver/transmitter (masthead antenna via splitter)
VHF repeater in cockpit

MADCAP:

AIS receiver/transmitter (masthead antenna via splitter)
Spotlight
VHF repeater in cockpit
Block & tackle to attach to halyard, clip to Lifesling
Expedition software
Chart plotter – nav station, helm (dimmed)
Mast mounted numeric instrument displays – range/bearing
Graphical instrument displays -helm, cockpit, nav station

- Once manually retrieved from belt pack and activated, the AIS MOB1 device quickly and effectively alerted boats in the area to the COB incident via AIS. The DSC transmission to *Callisto*'s MMSI number activated the COB emergency signal on the boat's VHF. The AIS data transmitted by the beacon provided *Madcap* and other boats in the area (including *OC68*, *MC^2*, and *Pommes Frites*) with effective range and bearing information to the COB.
- The Spinlock Pylon light was deemed "ineffective" by everyone involved. The consensus among the group was that besides the MOB AIS1 beacon the next most important piece of equipment when it came to locating the COB was the COB's ACR Firefly light. The strobe was extremely bright and made it possible for both *Callisto* and *Madcap* to visually locate the COB quickly.
- The Spinlock Lume-On bladder lights were deemed by John "nice when we got close"
- VHF communications were conducted on both vessels down below from the Nav stations, but the helm person could hear the conversations via repeaters at the helm.
- Shawn was wearing a Deckvest Vito lifejacket with a single tether cow hitched to Spinlock's Harness Release System ("HRS") for the soft loop harness connection. *Callisto* had "Y" tethers for the bow crew, but not for crew in the back of the boat.
- All crew on *Callisto* carried a ACR Firefly Waterbug Pro SOLAS strobe, AIS MOB1 beacon, knife, and whistle in a belt pack. Each item was attached to the belt pack by a lanyard. The crew was required to have their belt pack with them 24/7, regardless of wearing a life jacket or not. While this meant the activation of neither the beacon nor the strobe would be automatic, the crew would have them on their person while not wearing a life jacket. Had this been a COB event because of a boom strike, the outcome could have been much different as neither the AIS MOB device nor the Firefly strobe would have deployed. The crew of *Callisto*, *Madcap*, and other boats could have been searching for a COB without specific coordinates and illuminated only by an "ineffective" pylon light.
- A bright and effective spotlight was an important part of *Madcap*'s recovery of the COB, aiding the helmsman in approaching the COB.
- *Callisto*'s deployment of the MOM8 failed as it became tangled in the spinnaker and trapped under water. Deployment procedures should be reviewed, and crew should note conditions surrounding the boat before pulling the pin.
- Both boats utilized an AIS/VHF antenna splitter to their masthead VHF antenna without issue.
- As each navigator "accepted" the MOB AIS alert, the boat's instruments automatically switched to navigation to the COB location.
- Once *Madcap* was in visual range, within ½ mile, they navigated to the COB primarily via his strobe

***Callisto* – Jim Murray, skipper**

- Spinlock Vito deployed "violently". The COB was concerned that if the AIS MOB device was attached to the PDF it could have been damaged or separated from the vest.
- Will revisit their MOM8 deployment procedure to prevent it from being fouled by sails in the water.
- *Callisto* crew's safety at sea training and COB drills were instrumental in their safe and effective response to the COB incident.

- Reliance on consumer weather radar has been revisited. They saw clearing weather on the radar, but experienced building and shifting winds on the water. This highlighted the discrepancy between what the radar sees and the sailor experiences. They now rely on NOAA's weather radar at weather.gov, via Starlink.
- Spinlock Pylon light was "inadequate"
- ACR Firefly Pro Solas strobe was highly effective
- Navigator [radio operator] must have a calm and controlled handle on radio communications as multiple boats chimed in responding to the MOB beacon.
- Practice Practice Practice. Practicing as a team on the boat they raced on was a big factor in both team's responses.
- Knowledge of where all safety gear is on board was key
- Two-Day Hands-on Safety at Sea training was "really really helpful"
- Know your gear before you go in the water
- Contribute to your own rescue
- All safety gear, both personal and boat is the skipper/owner's responsibility (whether provided by the boat – as in *Callisto's* case, or by crew members) to proactively ensure all gear meets or exceeds standards and is in good workable condition.
- Has re-examined belt pack vs lifejacket mounting of AIS MOB1, strobe. AIS MOB1 and strobe will now be attached to lifejackets, automatic activation.
- Has re-examined tether strategy – all crew will now be equipped with double leg "Y" tethers.


COB – Shawn Dougherty

- "Strobe like the Firefly Pro really good. The lights that came with the Spinlock are more like a reading light for a guy that's in the water."
- SaS Pool Training: Stress how to adjust to keep warm in pool. How to adjust pressure in PFD.
- Crotch straps – would have been very uncomfortable without them.
- Interesting conversation could be had re wearing a belt pack **24/7** (the standard on *Callisto*) with the strobe, AIS MOB1 device, and knife, vs attached to PFD which is not worn 24/7

Madcap – John & Marian Hoskins

- Proactive preparation for storm (double reefed main, J4 jib) made quick response to COB easier.
- Having main down gave us a lot more options. More under control. Didn't have the boom swinging around as a danger to the crew. If main filled, we would have been doing 5+ knots. Able to stop the boat to weather of COB and throw the Lifesling. Absolutely would make it a priority to get sails down.
- Reinforce watch keeping at nav station during a storm by someone who knows the equipment and how to use it. If everyone is on deck, you won't have awareness of where everything is. Watch boats. Are they heading toward us?
- Ability to view NOAA weather via Starlink was a game changer. XM Weather horrible.
- Everyone with PFDs & tether. ALL double tether, quick release.
- Strobe – Unbelievable how well it worked! Lit up like a Christmas tree.
- Definitely perform a COB recovery under power, no sails. Driver and crew can concentrate on COB and approach slowly. (Although ... if recovering own crew would probably try main only).

Appendix A – Callisto Crew Placement at Time of COB



1 – Jim Murray - helm, straddling wheel, tether clipped to jackline

2 – Steve Orlebeke – trimming main, shoulder to shoulder with Murray, tether clipped to jackline

3 – Steven Leuck – assisting hauling in spinnaker. Tether clipped to central ring below companionway.

4 – Rob Evans – released sheet, against forward bulkhead, assisting take down, tether clipped to central ring below companionway

5 – Jared “Beach” Henderson – pit, coordinating letterbox drop, working halyard, tackline, and assisting take down.

6 – Jason Andrews – below companionway gathering spinnaker

Shawn Dougherty – Movement (S-1 & S-2)

- Blue arrow *intended* path
- Red arrow *actual* path

S-1 - Kneeling side deck just forward of starboard cabin top winch to assist take down, tether clipped to jackline

S-2 – Intent to return to cockpit, trim jib. Unclipped tether, moves aft in crouching position, left hand on lifeline. Narrow side deck makes tight squeeze between lifeline and #3 & #4

Appendix B – Event Narratives from *Callisto* after COB

Jim Murray, *Callisto* skipper – recap of on-line interview, emails.

Shawn went over the rail backwards, Jim was at the helm and witnessed the entire incident. *Callisto*'s SOG was approximately 15kts. The wind was whipping the kite strongly during the douse. It was “a good douse until Beach [Jared Henderson – the lone Category 3 Pro on board] let go of the kite to grab Shawn.” The kite filled and blew out of the hatch, landing in the water, Jim yelled “MAN OVERBOARD” and proceeded to drive the boat down. The spinnaker wrapped around the rudder, bringing the boat to a stop in less than 1 minute. The crew immediately activated the COB button to lock in Shawn's position. Jim could hear Shawn's PFD inflate. At the same time the kite wrapped the rudder, spinning the boat head to wind. Within 10 seconds of being head to wind, Jim could see Shawn's strobe off their bow. Jason down below saw the AIS signal from Shawn's MOB1, hit “Accept” and the mast instruments swapped to AIS nav data. Jim quickly made the decision to cut the kite to regain steerage. Jared Henderson suggested going into the water to cut the kite, which Jim declined. Everyone on *Callisto* had done multiple COB drills together so their actions were “well-rehearsed and calm.”

They deployed the MOM8 unit, which blew into the submerged kite and sank. They could see the deployed MOM8 strobe entangled in the spinnaker. Jim noted that in hindsight they should have paused on their deployment of the MOM8 to prevent it from wrapping in the spinnaker, rendering it effectively useless.

During this, Jason was down below on the radio. He broadcast a “PAN-PAN”, then hailed the USCG. Jim noted that in hindsight, this call should have been a “MAYDAY”. Jason was aware of several specific boats nearby as they, like *Callisto*, were transmitting as well as receiving AIS position data. Jason heard *Madcap* respond to his PAN-PAN and established communication with them less than 4 minutes after Shawn went COB. *Madcap* confirmed they were diverting to assist. Per YB, at 2215 *Madcap* was 0.80 nm SW of *Callisto*. *OC68* (Nelson Marek 68 owned by Oakcliff Sailing), 1.75 nm SSW of *Callisto*, responded as well to the VHF call, proceeded to the area and stood by.

In the 5-7 minutes it took to clear *Callisto*'s prop and rudder, Jim could see *Madcap*'s spotlight approaching Shawn's strobe. Jim estimated that during the process of stopping the boat, clearing the spinnaker, and getting back underway *Callisto* had drifted approximately one nautical mile (1nm) from Shawn's position.

Shawn was recovered by *Madcap* at 2230 CDT. By that point *Callisto* had established VHF contact with *Madcap*. John Hoskins was manning the VHF radio from the nav station on *Madcap* and confirmed with Jason that they had recovered Shawn uninjured. Shawn asked to speak with *Callisto* via VHF. The issue of how to transfer Shawn back to *Callisto* was raised. Both Jim and John determined the conditions did not allow for a transfer to happen safely. With ample resources on-board *Madcap*, the decision was made for both boats to continue racing, and Shawn to remain on *Madcap* for the remainder of the race.

Callisto communicated with the USCG, confirmed that the COB had been recovered, and assistance was not needed. Shawn's AIS MOB1 beacon was deactivated, and *Callisto* recovered all safety gear that had been deployed.

Callisto, *Madcap*, and *OC68* all resumed racing, and completed the 115th Race to Mackinac without further incident.

Jason Andrews, *Callisto* Navigator, via email

“...[W]e were approaching a front in the dark and had anticipated the front. We had discussed a plan, which was to shorten sail to a reefed main and J4 jib, which we did. I had been tracking the storm from on deck and at the nav station using Starlink and NWS weather resources. Initially the front looked like a solid wall but after 10-15 minutes (maybe longer) without a spinnaker, we rechecked weather and it looked like the front had dissipated when it moved over Lake Michigan. We gave it another 5 minutes and then hoisted the spinnaker and kept going (there were many boats that had sailed past us with spinnaker up).

“The spinnaker was up maybe 2-5 minutes and then the front hit and the incident occurred. I was below deck at the nav station using Starlink to download weather radar at the time. When it hit we called for a spinnaker takedown and I was the ‘squirrel’ pulling it below through the hatch (letterbox takedown). I recall feeling the boat rock back and forth during the onset and takedown but was focused on pulling the spinnaker below. We were about 2/3 of the way complete when [Jared] Beach Henderson, standing above me in the hatchway, let go of the spinnaker (I learned later he was trying to grab Shawn). I tried pulling the rest in myself but it quickly filled with wind and was sucked out of the boat in a way I’ve never experienced before. I came out of the hatchway only to see the spinnaker go straight over the boom and into the water and pass behind the boat.

“There was commotion and at that point I heard ‘Man Overboard!’ I recall seeing Rob release the MOB unit and I left the hatchway to press the MOB button on the binnacle, which I did. I looked up to see the MOB unit get sucked into the spinnaker, which was flagging behind the boat from the halyard, and disappear underwater (trapped under the spinnaker).

“I went below and got on the radio channel 16 and called ‘pan-pan, pan-pan, this is the sailing vessel *Callisto*, repeat sailing vessel *Callisto*, we have a man overboard, repeat man overboard’. [Moved here for clarity]: *Pan Pan was well before the DSC – probably 30-60 seconds or more because it took me two tries holding down the button and I believe there was a radio call between the first and second try (again, I didn’t hold it long enough in the panic of the moment).* The first response was from the US Coast Guard vessel shadowing the fleet. They asked our position. I struggled to get our position because it was completely dark down below and my headlamp had been knocked off in the commotion. I need reading glasses, which I had to find, and the GPS wasn’t readily available on the B&G and I wasn’t familiar enough with the unit to easily find it so I had to use Expedition on the laptop. I gave the coordinates verbally to US Coast Guard and then noticed that the MOB had not registered on Expedition (apparently, I didn’t hold the button at the binnacle long enough). I also struggled to activate the DSC on the radio because it had a cover over it, and it was hard to find in the dark. I eventually got the DSC activated but did not do anything more because there were many radio calls.

“I recalled hearing ‘I have no helm’ from Jim and Beach Henderson came below and grabbed a knife to start cutting away at the spinnaker which had apparently wrapped around the keel and/or rudder by then. The USCG notified us they were 7nm away and asked if we needed assistance and I replied ‘Yes, we are incapacitated and need all boats in the vicinity to render assistance to find our crew member’. I recall one boat contacting us [OC68] but then Madcap came on saying they were closer and heading in our direction. About this time Shawn activated his [AIS MOB device] and it registered on Expedition. He was 0.25nm from *Callisto* at that time drifting away from us. I called out Shawn’s coordinates over the radio when they appeared on my screen. Madcap acknowledged receipt of the [AIS MOB device transmission] and said they were heading in that direction. At this point I jumped to the companionway and asked ‘who is overboard?’ because I didn’t know at that time and Jim replied ‘Shawn’. Soon after I heard Jim say ‘I have a visual on Shawn’ so he had apparently turned on his strobe by then. I soon heard Madcap say ‘we have a visual on

the MOB'. There were coms between Madcap and myself coordinating the rescue as I saw them approach on AIS. At some point in there the USCG asked the nature of our situation and I replied, 'we have a spinnaker wrapped around our rudder'. Madcap and Callisto were in close communications, and they relayed they were attempting recovery - I relayed that the MOB's name was 'Shawn' so they could yell out to him.

"Madcap confirmed he was aboard and I relayed the recovery to our crew. About this time we cleared the rudder and started the engine and were in the vicinity of Madcap within a few minutes. We discussed a crew transfer but concluded with the weather and wave conditions that it was not safe for boats or crew so we agreed they would hold on to Shawn for the remainder of the race. We then killed the motor and continued sailing. I did not turn the DSC off until after Shawn was picked up - it was very hectic with the radio calls, crew communications, and directing traffic."

Appendix C – Callisto Crew Details

Crew of Callisto						
Name - Starting Position - Other Roles	SaS	Nights Racing/ Passage	Over Night Races	CYC Macs	BYC Macs	Experience Details – As Of 2024
James Murray Helm PIC, Skipper, Owner	Intl 2023	100	30	13	10	13 years as owner / skipper of J/109 Callisto 4 years as owner / skipper of Pac52 Callisto. - We have been campaigning both Callisto yachts on distance races over the past 5 years. In addition to the Macs, we have completed California Offshore Race Week, the Transpac, Newport-Bermuda, the Nassau Cup, the Wirth Munroe, and the Pineapple Cup.
Steve Orlebeke Main Trim Reserve PIC Watch-Captain	Intl 2023	181	58	28	27	- Transatlantic in 1991 on Swan 51. 28 Chi Macs. 27 Bayview Macs Santa Cruz 70 Evolution, 2021 Transpac, 2022 Newport-Bermuda, 2 x Caribbean 600, 2023 Miami-Montego Bay(Pineapple Cup) on Pac 52 Callisto. - Watch captain/ helmsman/ trimmer on all.
Shawn Dougherty (COB) Offside Trim	Intl 2024	46	18	2	0	(2) Transpacs (Skipper/Driver/Main Trimmer), - Pac Cup (Skipper), - Van Isle 360 (Skipper), (5) Swiftsure (Skipper), (5) Northern Century (Skipper), - California Offshore (Mainsail Trim/Driver), - Newport Bermuda (Sail Trim/Driver), - Caribbean 600 (Mainsail Trim/Driver), - Pineapple Cup (Mainsail Trim/Driver)
Steven Leuck Bow	OS 2024	20	4	0	0	4x College and high school national champion, - PAC52- Caribbean 600 x2 bow, - Pineapple Cup Miami-Jamaica, - Delivery West Palm to Antigua (7 days), - Wurth Monroe Race grinder, - Kings Cup Thailand (5days). - Coach Lake Forest Sailing
Robert “Rob” Evans II Primary Trim	Expired OS 2019	55	24	9	6	8 Chicago to Mackinac Races 2010 - 2020 (6 as skipper, 2 as crew) J109 1Transpac Race 2021 (Crew) PAC 52 1 Caribbean 600 Race 2022 (Crew) PAC 52 5 Bayview Races (2 as skipper, 3 as crew over last 6 years) J109 / Pac 52 - Newport CA to Ensenada: (4 races as crew 2015-2019) J105 - Trans Superior Race 2019 (crew) Nelson Marek 50
Jason Andrews Navigator Floater	Intl 2024	50	10	1	1	- Van Isle 360 2017 on J/125 Callisto as skipper / navigator, - CYC Mac 2018 on J/109 Callisto as crew member, - Transpac 2019 on J/125 Hamachi - overall winner as skipper / navigator, - Bayview Mac 2020 on Pac 52 Callisto as navigator, - California Offshore Race Week 2021 on Pac 52 Callisto as Navigator, - Transpac 2021 on Pac 52 Callisto, - Pacific Cup 2022 on J/125 Hamachi - 3rd overall as skipper / navigator, - Hong Kong to Vietnam Race on Pac 52 Callisto
Jared (“Beach”) Henderson Watch Captain Pit, Cat 3Pro	Intl 2022	500	150	2	0	Have been sailing professionally for 32 years
Total	6	952	294	55	44	
Average	86%	136	42	7.9	6.3	

Appendix D – Madcap Crew Details

Crew of Madcap						
Name, Roles Recovery Role	SaS	Nights Racing/ Passage	Over Night Race s	CYC Macs	BYC Macs	Experience Details
John Hoskins Owner, PIC, Skipper Navigator	OS 2022	205	50	21	3	- Completed Rolex Middle Sea Race (Malta) 2021 as Navigator, J122 - Completed 21 Chicago Macs (98-2000, 2002-2010, 2012, 2014, 2016-2019, 2021-2023), and three Bayview Mac races in 2017, 2020, 2021. Primary duty owner, navigator, helmsman and person in charge - Completed 7 GLSS Solo Chicago Macs (2005,2006,2007,2009,2012,2016,2023) Sailing a Baltic 37 for the first three, a J30 for two, Express 37 in 2016, Santa Cruz 52 in 2023. - Currently own a Santa Cruz 52 with my wife. - Navigator for Bodacious Racing 2008-2015: 2008 Newport Bermuda sailing a Sabre 40 2011 Pineapple Cup on a R/P Baltic 45 2011 TransPac (DNF crew injury early in the race) on a R/P Baltic 45 2012 Chicago Mac Race sailing a Santa Cruz 52 2013 Newport Cabo Race sailing a Santa Cruz 52 2013 TransPac sailing a Santa Cruz 52 2014 Newport Bermuda sailing a Santa Cruz 52 2015 NYHC Islands Race sailing Santa Cruz 52 - Hook Race (all races as owner, PIC, and navigator): 1996 Mirage 338, 2011 Double-handed (DNF 4 miles from finish, storm) on J30, 2015 On Express 37, and 2020 on my Santa Cruz 52 (1st overall), 2022 (3rd Overall), 2023 3rd sec. - LMSS Solo/Double-handed races (sailed on a J30 from 2008-2013 and Express 37 2014-2019, SC 52 2020-2023): Solo 2008, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2020 Double 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 Q Race 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2023
Marian (Marian) Hoskins Owner, Watch-Captain Coordinate Deck-Nav comms during COB recovery	OS 2022	112	26	17	6	17 Chicago Macs 6 Bayview Macs 2021 Middle Sea race (Malta) on J/122 “Noisy Oyster” as main trimmer 1994 Antigua Race Week, Mumm 30 1992 Commodore’s Cup, Cowes, UK on Wylie 46 1992 Antigua Race Week, Wylie 46 1991 San Diego to Ensenada, Mexico 80 ft Maxi 6 Port Huron to Macs: as foredeck 1992, as Owner and Watch Captain (2020 Express 37-2017, 2020-2024 SC52) 4 Chicago to Mac Race on SC52 “Madcap” as Owner and Watch Captain (2021- 2024) 4 Chicago to Mac Race on Express 37 “Madcap” as Owner and Watch Captain (2016-2019) 4 Hook races as Trimmer (2011 -2020), 2013 as skipper on J/30, Express 37 and SC52 9 Chicago to Mac Race races on boats ranging from 30-45’ (1992-2010) in various positions - Many Queen’s Cup races overnight to Michigan 50+ cruising deliveries as USCG captain on Great Lakes and in Caribbean (2005-present) 9 LMSS Double and Solo/Double Races (J/30, Express 37 (2014-2019), SC52 (2020 to present): 1 double-handed race 2X2, year 2014, on Express 37 “Madcap,” 135 nm - Q Race, LMSS, 2011, 2017 - Double-Handed Race, LMSS, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

Michael Smith Reserve PIC, Watch-Captain, Main, helm, tactics Driver during COB recovery	OS 2022	200	90	29	28	54 years of racing, offshore, and cruising experience, including 57+ Chicago/Bayview Mackinac races dating back to 1977, ranging from small racer cruisers to SC 70's. Watch captain numerous boats including Madcap (SC52/Express 37) over the past 7 years. Navigator/watch captain on N/40 Sensation (overall winner Chicago/Bayview in 1992), J111 Kashmir, NM50 Goblin, and N/M 50 Champosa. Main and headsail trim on SC70 Hulua and N/M 50 Champosa. 25 Mackinac Podiums, including 14 first-place finishes, and 3 overall victories. - Offshore racing in Asia, Europe, Florida, and California; podium finishes including but not limited to the Suursarri Race (Finland to Russia and back), Newport Ensenada Race, Rolex Middle Sea Race, Islands Race (CA), etc. Offshore cruising experience in Asai, New Zealand, Australia, Finland, the Caribbean, Bahamas, Florida, California, Mexico, and, of course, the Great Lakes. Watch captain, systems engineer, and navigator on the Oyster 72 AEGIS delivery from Newport to Puerto Rico. - Buoy racing in Europe, Asia, Great Lakes, Florida, California, and the northeast, including but not limited to the SORC, Key West Race Week, various one-design NA championships, IMS worlds, etc. Big-10 intercollegiate sailing back in the 1980s. - A Boat owner since 1994, including my current Peterson 37 ACCORD since 2009. Multiple single/double-handed victories in races ranging from 30 to 150 miles in California/Mexico and the Great Lakes. ACCORD won the 2023 Queens Cup overall.
Arek Szawlowski Pit	OS 2024	125	26	8	1	- Licensed 50T near coastal captain. - Raced dingy since kid. First Mac 2006 on Swan 53 Fox. Did several long distance deliveries both ocean and Great Lakes.
Matthew Rubsam Pit Pit, search light, sails	OS 2022 Intl 2017	111	16	7	2	Jeanneau SO 379 5 years - Tartan 10. 3 years - Beneteau 40.7 4 years Express 37. 2 years - Santa Cruse 52 3 years - Owner of 1D48. 5th years on which I have completed 2 solo Chicago Mac race. Multiple overnight passages with crew and solo. - Coastguard rating Master 100 Tons Self Propelled vessels including Sail or Auxiliary sail. On Great Lakes and Inland Waters. 50 Ton rating for Near Coastal Waters. Completed classes in Marine Electrical and Diesel Maintenance. - Experienced in many aspects of boat repair and maintenance
Thomas Hoskins Mast, foresail trim, helm Trim, COB spotter	No	52	42	14	1	- Sailing since 2 years old. Junior sailing Waukegan, Loyola Academy High School sailing team. Massachusetts Maritime Academy sailing team (multiple offshore podiums, ranked 3rd as skipper for keelboat NEISA, qualified for collegiate offshore world championships in France). 14 CYC Macs, 1 Bayview Mac, - Newport Harbor YC Island race (helm, Bodacious). - Big Boat series St Frances Yacht Club (SC 52), - Richmond Yacht Club Olsen 30s and J120 fleets. - Collegiate J22 and J80 race series. 3rd in CYC NOOD J105 (bow for Johnstone's Ragtime). - US Sailing instructor. USCG 1600-ton Mates license, 50 ton sailing aux master. Professional kiteboarder for Airush. - Multiple CYC Macs on MADCAP (J30 double handed, Express 37 and SC 52, all helm or trim). First CYC Mac was onboard Nana 1991.
Connor Adams Foresail trim, midbow Sails, COB spotter	OS 2022	32	18	15	1	- LFHS HS sailing, - RWU collegiate sailing, - Started in 15 Chicago mac races, finished 14. - Race in the J/70 fleet. - FF/EMT certified.

Mark Strube Watch Captain Helm, main trimmer	Intl 2024	150	30	5	2	200 Ton Masters Captains License. - Current Captain of IACC boat Abracadabra, Competed in 3 Louis Vuitton Cups. 2000, 2003, 2007. 4 US Olympic Trials in the Star finishing 2,3,4 and 9. 5.5 Meter World Champion. Star Bacardi Cup Champion, 2X Star NA Champion, 1x Star European Champion, 2X Star Keil Week Champion, 1X Melges 24 Slovenia National Champion, 1X Etchells Bermuda National Champion, - Transpac Barn Door trophy, - Newport Bermuda Race, 3X SDYC Puerto Vallarta, - NZ Match Racing Champion, Australia Cup Match Racing Champion, 6 Congressional Cups, 5 Bermuda Gold Cups. - Boats I've sailed on include Boomerang, Genuine Risk, Titan, Money Penny, Morning Glory, Rosebud, Proteus, Pegasus, Pyewacket, and many others. Specialize in Star, Melges 24, Etchells, and boats over 50 feet. Mostly a grinder but also trimmer, driver and mast. - Current First Aid CPR. Sailed in over 40 countries, Crew on every SSL finals in the Bahamas. Grew up sailing in Milwaukee took the lessons and then taught them for my 5 summers while going to College.
Paul Hogue	Intl 2024 2019	250	39	20	13	Highly experienced offshore sailor with approximately 19 Chi Mac and 13 PH Mac races along with SoCal 300, 6 Newport to Ensenada, Kenwood cup, Islands Races, Transpac and offshore deliveries. Current in safety at Sea training.
Dale Scoggin	No	62	19	3	0	Pacific Cup 2000 Coastal Cup 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Newport to Bermuda, Marblehead to Halifax, Round the Island Race (Isle of Wight) Spinnaker Cup (multiple), Windjammers (multiple) Chicago to Mackinac Island 2017 (Viper, Hunter 35), 2023 (Madcap, Santa Cruz 52) Rolex Big Boat Series 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004 – 2022 Farallones Islands Race 1996 – 2015 Great Vallejo Race 1994 – 2019 Delta Ditch Run 1997 – 2019
Jeff Gabbard	No	70	33	24	1	Safety At Sea Seminar / US Sailing: April 14th, 2012- Chicago to Mac Races: 1991, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 00, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 11, 13, 15, 18, 22, 23- Port Huron to Mac Races: 1992- Chicago NOOD Regatta: 1993, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 00, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 23- Chicago Verve Cup Regattas: 1993, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 00, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 23- Queens Cup Races: 1991, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 2000, 2012, 2014, 2015- Newport Bermuda: 2010, 2012- Annapolis to Newport: 2010- Block Island Race: 2012- BVI Spring Regatta: 2013, 2014- Etchells Jaguar Cup Series: 2004, 05, 06, 07, 08- Etchells Charleston Series: 2009, 10- Farr 40 Chicago: 2004, 05- Hook Races: 2014, 15- Beneteau 36.7 Fleet Chicago: 2010, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24
Total	8	1369	370	163	57	
Average	73%	124	34	14.8	5.2	

Appendix E – Redress Requests

MADCAP Redress Request:

After receiving a VHF call on channel 16 from sailing vessel Callisto NZL 12502, Madcap USA 51092 suspended racing to respond and recover COB Shawn Dougherty. At 22:22 we heard the MOB's signal PLB signal thru DSC and AIS that gave us a location of 43 21.002N 87 00.438W. We had a visual of the MOB. Recovery of the MOB was successful with no injuries. At the time of the call we were averaging 10 knots boat speed heading of 18 degrees COG. As soon as we headed to the position of the PLB latitude and long we saw a bright light coming from ARC Firefly Pro from the MOB. We recovered the MOB with a Life Sling and no sails up under power. Once MOB was secured below we resumed racing. At 22:50, Madcap resumed racing with Shawn Dougherty safely onboard.

DECISION

- 1. Redress is given to Madcap. Madcap's elapsed finish time shall be reduced by 45m to 01d, 8h, 4m, 19s Madcap's corrected time shall be adjusted accordingly and the results of the race shall be recalculated adjusted for Madcap's elapsed time of 01d, 8h, 4m, 19s*
- 2. To demonstrate the commended actions by the crew of Madcap and to highlight the success of MOB beacons and MOB training, this decision will be published in full. (See attached document)*
- 3. Madcap is to be commended for their actions assisting the crew of Callisto.*

OC68 Redress Request:

On Saturday night a man overboard call went over Channel 16 from Callisto who had a man overboard during the initial parts of Saturday nights storm. We promptly took down our kite and without a headsail proceeded to the MOB. We were able to see the strobe on the person who was in the water. Madcap had taken their sails down and were closer to the incident. Radio communication was continued through the entire event on 16. We were standing by about .25 nm from the person in the water while both Madcap retrieved the person. Callisto was unable to assist due to their kite wrapped around their rudder. We are seeking redress while standing by for this incident.

DECISION:

- 1. Redress is given to OC68. OC68's elapsed finish time shall be lowered by 01h 15m 0s to 01d, 8h, 42m, 5s. OC68's corrected time shall be adjusted accordingly, and the results of the race shall be recalculated adjusted for OC68's elapsed time of 01d, 8h, 42m, 5s*
- 2. OC68 is to be commended for their actions assisting the crew of Callisto*

Appendix F

- Event Location Overview

- YB Tracking


To the right is an overview of the lower 2/3 of the racecourse at 2220 CDT.

All 252 boats competing in the race were equipped with satellite trackers from YB Tracking which displayed boat position and tracks with 15-minute update intervals.


The 2024 race can be accessed with this link: <https://yb.tl/chicagomac2024>.

Select the "CYC Race to Mackinac 2024" view option.


On the following two page s are annotated screenshots from YB Tracking surrounding the time and area of the COB event.



2215 CDT




Callisto at 2220 CDT – slowed to 1.2 kts. Madcap 4.1kts, OC68 6.1 kts




Appendix G – Madcap Expedition mapping – annotated AIS tracks of Madcap & Callisto

Madcap & Callisto tracks




Madcap detailed timeline mapping:




Appendix H – Weather Radar Sequence


1900 CDT




2105 CDT



2200 CDT



2210 CDT



Appendix I – Report Panel

The following individuals were commissioned by the Chicago Yacht Club Mackinac Committee to review and create a report documenting the facts of the July 13, 2024, COB from the J125 Callisto and make recommendations to enhance the safety of offshore racing and reduce the likelihood of a future similar incident:

- Kevin Foote
 - Chicago Yacht Club Mackinac Committee– Vice Chair
 - Chicago Yacht Club – member
 - USCG Master
 - Representative to US Sailing Congress of Safety at Sea Parties
- Tom Falck
 - Chicago Yacht Club Mackinac Committee –Chief Safety Officer
 - Chicago Yacht Club Regatta Association, Inc. (Organizing Authority) – Director, Secretary
 - Chicago Yacht Club – member, Club Measurer
- Graham Sauser
 - Chicago Yacht Club Mackinac Committee – member, former Chief Safety Officer
 - Chicago Yacht Club - member
 - Storm Trysail Club Youth Safety At Sea Instructor
 - USCG Master
- Jonathan Kabak
 - US Sailing Safety At Sea Committee Member
 - Safety at Sea Moderator
 - US Sailing Safety at Sea Moderator Group – Chair
 - Professional Mariner
- Renee Mehl
 - US Sailing Safety at Sea Committee Member
 - US Naval Academy Command & Seamanship (Sail) Training Squadron - Director
 - US Naval Academy Safety at Sea Seminar - Planning Chair
 - Storm Trysail Club and Cruising Club of America - Member

END OF REPORT

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